Nuclear deal between india and us pdf
Under an interim nuclear deal in , Iran agreed not to commission or fuel the reactor. Under the JCPOA, Iran said it would redesign the reactor so it could not produce any weapons-grade plutonium, and that all spent fuel would be sent out of the country as long as the modified reactor existed. Iran must also not build additional heavy-water reactors or accumulate any excess heavy water until Iran, it said, had committed to "extraordinary and robust monitoring, verification, and inspection".
Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA , the global nuclear watchdog, were tasked with continuously monitoring Iran's declared nuclear sites and verifying that no fissile material is moved covertly to a secret location to build a bomb.
Iran also agreed to implement the Additional Protocol to their IAEA Safeguards Agreement, which allows inspectors to access any site anywhere in the country they deem suspicious.
If it refuses, an eight-member Joint Commission - including Iran - will rule on the issue. It can decide on punitive steps, including the reimposition of sanctions. A majority vote by the commission suffices. Before July , Iran had enough enriched uranium and centrifuges to create eight to 10 bombs, according to the then Obama administration.
The Obama administration said the JCPOA would remove the key elements Iran would need to create a bomb and increase its break-out time to one year or more.
Iran also agreed not to engage in activities, including research and development, which could contribute to the development of a nuclear bomb. In December , the IAEA's board of governors voted to end its decade-long investigation into the possible military dimensions of Iran's nuclear programme.
The agency's then-director-general, Yukiya Amano, said the report concluded that until Iran had conducted "a co-ordinated effort" on "a range of activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device".
Iran continued with some activities until , but after that there were "no credible indications" of weapons development, he added. Iran also agreed to the continuation of a UN ban on its imports and exports of conventional arms until Restrictions on its import of ballistic missile technology will remain in place until On Oil and Gas: The impact on world oil prices will be the immediately visible impact.
Iran nuclear deal What to study? What was the iran nuclear deal? Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action JCPoA Tehran agreed to significantly cut its stores of centrifuges, enriched uranium and heavy-water, all key components for nuclear weapons.
Why did Iran agree to the deal? Why has US pulled out of the deal? There is little doubt that the US and India played pivotal roles in the discussions leading up to the Paris Agreement. Prime Minister Modi, recognising the significance of securing an international consensus on mitigating climate change, pushed back against many in his own country to commit India to concrete pledges that made the final compact possible.
While this term has taken on new life under President Trump, the defining agreement between the US and India occurred under President Obama. Articulating the larger objective in this way was remarkable for many reasons.
Second, India utilised the process of developing the joint strategic vision to convey to the US and to others how it intended to contribute towards the common goal of ensuring maritime security in its traditional and new operating spaces in the Indo-Pacific.
Third, and finally, the US—in active collaboration with India—began to treat the joint vision statement as a road map for developing the bureaucratic justifications necessary to authorise the sale of advanced military technologies that would enable India to execute the relevant operational missions in the wider Indian Ocean Region.
Today, the US—India relationship encompasses the most intense bilateral engagement that New Delhi enjoys with any nation. Given the steady expansion of the bilateral partnership over the last two decades, the range of joint activities today is breathtaking: from frequent bilateral summits between the heads of government to regular senior-level dialogues, the US and India today engage in numerous strategic consultations, wide-ranging defence, counterterrorism, homeland security, cybersecurity and intelligence cooperation, as well as myriad activities in energy, education, science and technology, public health and culture.
For all the breadth of its successes, however, the partnership still lacks the requisite depth; mitigating this deficit remains the key task for both countries in the years ahead.
Three elements in particular deserve concerted attention. When individual hindrances are brought to his attention, he is invariably quick to resolve them, but the very fact that impediments repeatedly emerge—and are not resolved at lower levels of government—suggests that his vision may not be sufficiently internalised by his ministerial colleagues and their supporting bureaucracies.
Since this challenge remains, albeit in different ways, there is perhaps no alternative in the near term to greater oversight by the Prime Minister himself and his national security team, if the promise of a deeper US—India strategic partnership is to be meaningfully realised.
Furthermore, because the national security space remains the most critical arena for deepening US—India ties, it is unlikely that New Delhi will be able to take full advantage of its cooperation with Washington without structural reforms in Indian defence policy.
Finally, the strategic partnership between Washington and New Delhi will remain perpetually handicapped if trade relations between the two countries remain un-reformed. India, under Modi and even before, has made significant progress in opening its economy to foreign investment.
This is undoubtedly a major step forward, but it remains incomplete so long as the US exports to India still remain limited by regulation and policy. Download the PDF. This tragic development has been detailed in Baru, Sanjaya. Vajpayee, Atal Bihari. For a survey of this period, see Tellis, Ashley J. Mohan, C Raja. Tellis, Ashley J. Malik, J Mohan. This challenge is analysed in detail in Tellis, Ashley J. Piccone, Ted. Ganguly, Sumit.
The logic of this strategy is analysed in Tellis, Ashley J.
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